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Response	  inhibition	  is	  a	  hallmark	  of	  cognitive	  control.	  An	  executive	  system	  inhibits	  responses	  by	  
activating	  a	  stop	  goal	  when	  a	  stop	  signal	  is	  presented.	  The	  authors	  asked	  whether	  the	  stop	  goal	  could	  be	  
primed	  by	  task-­‐irrelevant	  information	  in	  stop-­‐signal	  and	  go/no-­‐go	  paradigms.	  In	  Experiment	  1,	  the	  task-­‐
irrelevant	  primes	  ‘GO’,	  ‘###’	  or	  ‘STOP’	  were	  presented	  in	  the	  go	  stimulus.	  Go	  performance	  was	  slower	  
for	  ‘STOP’	  than	  for	  ‘###’	  or	  ‘GO’.	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  stop	  goal	  was	  primed	  by	  task-­‐irrelevant	  
information.	  In	  Experiment	  2,	  ‘STOP’	  primed	  the	  stop	  goal	  only	  in	  conditions	  in	  which	  the	  goal	  was	  
relevant	  to	  the	  task	  context.	  In	  Experiment	  3,	  ‘GO’,	  ‘###’	  or	  ‘STOP’	  were	  presented	  as	  stop	  signal.	  Stop	  
performance	  was	  slower	  for	  ‘GO’	  than	  for	  ‘###’	  or	  ‘STOP’.	  These	  findings	  suggest	  that	  task	  goals	  can	  be	  







Cognitive	  control	  theories	  attribute	  flexible,	  goal-­‐directed	  behavior	  to	  an	  executive	  system,	  which	  
controls	  performance	  by	  intentionally	  activating	  goals	  and	  manipulating	  their	  activation	  (Logan	  &	  
Gordon,	  2001;	  Meyer	  &	  Kieras,	  1997;	  Miller	  &	  Cohen,	  2001;	  Unsworth	  &	  Engle,	  2007).	  However,	  several	  
lines	  of	  research	  suggest	  that	  task	  goals	  can	  be	  activated	  automatically	  and	  unintentionally	  by	  
information	  in	  the	  task	  environment	  (Aarts,	  Gollwitzer,	  &	  Hassin,	  2004;	  Bargh,	  Gollwitzer,	  Lee-­‐Chai,	  
Barndollar,	  &	  Trotschel,	  2001;	  Shah,	  2003).	  Furthermore,	  studies	  of	  automaticity	  and	  learning	  suggest	  
that	  people	  can	  learn	  associations	  between	  stimuli	  and	  task	  goals	  over	  practice,	  leading	  to	  automatic	  
activation	  of	  task	  goals	  via	  retrieval	  of	  stimulus-­‐task	  associations	  from	  memory	  (Koch	  &	  Allport,	  2006;	  
Verbruggen	  &	  Logan,	  2008a;	  Waszak,	  Hommel,	  &	  Allport,	  2003).	  Thus,	  cognitive	  control	  can	  be	  triggered	  
in	  an	  intentional	  fashion	  (top-­‐down)	  and	  in	  an	  unintentional,	  stimulus-­‐driven	  fashion	  (bottom-­‐up).	  In	  the	  
present	  study,	  we	  examined	  the	  involvement	  of	  bottom-­‐up	  control	  in	  response-­‐inhibition	  paradigms.	  	  
	   The	  role	  of	  executive	  control	  in	  many	  paradigms	  is	  still	  debated	  (e.g.	  Logan	  &	  Bundesen,	  2003;	  
Mayr,	  Awh,	  &	  Laurey,	  2003),	  but	  most	  researchers	  agree	  that	  executive	  control	  is	  involved	  in	  inhibiting	  a	  
planned	  or	  ongoing	  motor	  response	  in	  response	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  environment	  or	  internal	  state	  (Aron,	  
2007;	  Logan	  &	  Cowan,	  1984;	  Miyake	  et	  al.,	  2000;	  Verbruggen	  &	  Logan,	  2008c).	  Response	  inhibition	  is	  
often	  studied	  in	  the	  stop-­‐signal	  paradigm	  (Logan	  &	  Cowan,	  1984;	  for	  a	  review,	  see	  Verbruggen	  &	  Logan,	  
2008c).	  In	  this	  paradigm,	  subjects	  perform	  a	  go	  task,	  such	  as	  reporting	  the	  identity	  of	  a	  stimulus.	  
Occasionally,	  a	  stop	  signal	  is	  presented,	  which	  instructs	  subjects	  to	  withhold	  the	  response	  on	  that	  trial.	  
When	  a	  stop	  signal	  is	  presented,	  an	  executive	  system	  activates	  a	  stop	  goal;	  when	  the	  stop	  goal	  is	  
activated,	  it	  inhibits	  the	  go	  goal	  and	  suppresses	  the	  go	  response	  (Logan	  &	  Cowan,	  1984).	  
	   In	  three	  experiments,	  we	  attempted	  to	  prime	  the	  go	  and	  stop	  goals	  in	  the	  stop-­‐signal	  paradigm	  
and	  the	  related	  go/no-­‐go	  paradigm.	  We	  presented	  primes	  that	  were	  associated	  with	  going	  and	  stopping,	  
without	  specifying	  which	  go	  response	  had	  to	  be	  executed	  or	  stopped.	  This	  allowed	  us	  to	  distinguish	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between	  goal	  priming	  and	  response	  priming.	  Goal	  priming	  is	  general,	  influencing	  all	  possible	  responses,	  
whereas	  response	  priming	  is	  more	  specific,	  activating	  one	  response	  out	  of	  many	  (e.g.,	  Stroop	  and	  
flanker	  paradigms).	  If	  the	  stop	  goal	  is	  primed,	  then	  all	  go	  responses	  should	  be	  slowed;	  if	  the	  go	  goal	  is	  
primed,	  then	  the	  stop–signal	  response	  should	  be	  slowed.	  	  We	  assumed	  that	  priming	  would	  be	  automatic	  
and	  unintentional	  because	  the	  primes	  never	  predicted	  whether	  subjects	  needed	  to	  go	  or	  stop	  or	  which	  
go	  response	  they	  should	  make	  (Tzelgov,	  1997).	  
Experiment	  1	  
Experiment	  1	  tested	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  go	  and	  stop	  goals	  could	  be	  primed	  by	  task-­‐irrelevant	  
information	  that	  appeared	  in	  the	  go	  stimulus	  in	  a	  stop-­‐signal	  task	  (see	  Figure	  1).	  Subjects	  were	  
instructed	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  go	  stimulus,	  but	  to	  withhold	  the	  response	  when	  an	  auditory	  stop	  signal	  was	  
presented.	  They	  were	  instructed	  to	  ignore	  the	  primes	  in	  the	  go	  stimulus.	  There	  were	  three	  primes:	  ‘GO’,	  
‘###’	  and	  ‘STOP’.	  We	  included	  the	  neutral	  prime	  ‘###’	  to	  determine	  whether	  there	  was	  a	  priming	  cost	  
(i.e,	  impairment	  of	  performance	  when	  the	  prime	  is	  incongruent	  with	  the	  relevant	  goal),	  a	  priming	  
benefit	  (i.e.,	  facilitation	  of	  performance	  when	  the	  prime	  is	  congruent	  with	  the	  relevant	  goal),	  or	  both.	  If	  
‘STOP‘	  primes	  the	  stop	  goal,	  then	  go	  performance	  should	  be	  impaired	  but	  stop	  performance	  should	  be	  
facilitated;	  consequently,	  go	  reaction	  times	  (RTs)	  should	  be	  longer	  but	  stop-­‐signal	  reaction	  times	  (i.e.,	  
the	  latency	  of	  the	  stop	  process;	  SSRT)	  should	  be	  shorter	  for	  ‘STOP’	  than	  for	  ‘###’.	  If	  ‘GO’	  primes	  the	  go	  
goal,	  then	  go	  performance	  should	  be	  facilitated	  but	  stop	  performance	  should	  be	  impaired;	  
consequently,	  RTs	  should	  be	  shorter	  but	  SSRTs	  should	  be	  longer	  for	  ‘GO’	  than	  for	  ‘###’.	  	  
Method	  
Twenty	  students	  from	  Vanderbilt	  University	  participated	  for	  course	  credit.	  	  The	  experiment	  was	  run	  on	  a	  
Pentium	  4	  PC	  running	  STOP-­‐IT	  (Verbruggen,	  Logan,	  &	  Stevens,	  2008).	  The	  stimuli	  were	  presented	  on	  a	  
19-­‐inch	  cathode	  ray	  tube	  monitor.	  The	  go	  task	  was	  to	  respond	  as	  quickly	  and	  accurately	  as	  possible	  to	  a	  
white	  filled	  square	  (25	  x	  25	  mm)	  or	  circle	  (25	  mm	  diameter)	  by	  pressing	  the	  ‘Z‘	  (with	  the	  left	  index	  
5 
 
finger)	  or	  ‘/’	  (with	  the	  right	  index	  finger)	  keys	  of	  a	  QWERTY	  keyboard,	  respectively.	  The	  stimuli	  were	  
presented	  centrally	  on	  a	  black	  background.	  There	  were	  three	  primes:	  ‘GO’	  (in	  green;	  12	  x	  7	  mm),	  ‘###’	  
(in	  blue;	  18	  x	  7	  mm),	  and	  ‘STOP’	  (in	  red;	  24	  x	  7	  mm).	  The	  primes	  were	  presented	  in	  the	  go	  stimuli	  and	  
occurred	  with	  equal	  probability.	  Subjects	  were	  instructed	  to	  ignore	  the	  primes.	  
	   On	  25%	  of	  the	  trials,	  an	  auditory	  stop	  signal	  (750	  Hz,	  80dB,	  75	  ms)	  was	  presented	  through	  closed	  
headphones	  (Sennheiser	  eH150).	  Stop-­‐signal	  delay	  (SSD)	  was	  initially	  set	  at	  250	  ms	  and	  continually	  
adjusted	  according	  to	  a	  tracking	  procedure	  to	  obtain	  a	  probability	  of	  stopping	  of	  .50.	  Each	  time	  a	  subject	  
responded	  on	  a	  signal	  trial,	  SSD	  decreased	  by	  50	  ms;	  each	  time	  a	  subject	  inhibited	  successfully,	  SSD	  
increased	  by	  50	  ms.	  We	  used	  separate	  tracking	  procedures	  for	  the	  three	  primes.	  Subjects	  were	  informed	  
about	  the	  tracking	  procedure	  and	  they	  were	  told	  not	  to	  wait	  for	  a	  stop	  signal	  to	  occur.	  	  
	   The	  experiment	  started	  with	  a	  practice	  block	  of	  32	  trials,	  followed	  by	  12	  experimental	  blocks	  of	  
72	  trials.	  Trial	  course	  and	  duration	  of	  time	  intervals	  are	  depicted	  in	  Figure	  1.	   	   	  
Results	  and	  Discussion	  
Means	  of	  go	  and	  stop	  performance	  appear	  in	  Tables	  1	  and	  2,	  respectively.	  We	  excluded	  no-­‐signal	  trials	  
that	  followed	  a	  signal	  trial	  because	  go	  performance	  is	  often	  influenced	  by	  a	  stop	  signal	  on	  the	  previous	  
trial	  (Rieger	  &	  Gauggel,	  1999;	  Verbruggen,	  Logan,	  Liefooghe,	  &	  Vandierendonck,	  2008).	  Mean	  go	  RTs	  for	  
correct	  trials	  were	  calculated	  after	  exclusion	  of	  trials	  that	  followed	  a	  go	  error1.	  For	  every	  prime,	  SSRT	  
was	  calculated	  by	  subtracting	  mean	  SSD	  from	  mean	  RT	  of	  all	  no-­‐signal	  trials	  (Logan,	  Schachar,	  &	  
Tannock,	  1997;	  Verbruggen	  &	  Logan,	  2009).	  Go	  RT	  and	  SSRT	  were	  analyzed	  by	  means	  of	  separate	  
repeated	  measures	  ANOVAs	  with	  prime	  (GO,	  ###,	  or	  STOP)	  as	  within-­‐subjects	  factor.	  Go	  errors	  and	  
number	  of	  missed	  responses	  on	  go	  trials	  were	  low	  and	  were	  not	  further	  analyzed.	  	  
	   As	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Table	  3,	  go	  RT	  on	  no-­‐signal	  trials	  was	  significantly	  longer	  for	  ‘STOP’	  than	  for	  
‘###’.	  There	  was	  no	  reliable	  difference	  between	  ‘###’	  and	  ‘GO’.	  This	  suggests	  there	  was	  a	  priming	  cost	  
but	  no	  priming	  benefit	  in	  the	  go	  task.	  There	  was	  no	  significant	  effect	  of	  prime	  on	  SSRT,	  F(2,38)	  >	  1.7,	  but	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we	  observed	  numerical	  differences	  between	  the	  neutral	  prime	  and	  the	  other	  primes.	  Unlike	  go	  RTs,	  
SSRTs	  need	  to	  be	  estimated;	  consequently,	  SSRTs	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  unstable	  than	  RTs.	  	  Closer	  inspection	  
of	  the	  SSRT	  data	  showed	  that	  SSRT	  differences	  were	  inconsistent	  across	  subjects.	  Possibly,	  we	  did	  not	  
find	  a	  consistent	  priming	  effect	  for	  stopping	  because	  the	  prime	  was	  part	  of	  the	  go	  stimulus	  and	  not	  part	  
of	  the	  stop	  signal.	  We	  tested	  this	  hypothesis	  in	  Experiment	  3.	  	  
Experiment	  2	  
In	  Experiment	  2,	  we	  asked	  whether	  priming	  of	  the	  stop	  goal	  depended	  on	  the	  task	  context.	  Bargh	  et	  al.	  
(2001)	  showed	  that	  goal	  priming	  did	  not	  require	  an	  intentionally	  activated	  goal	  to	  operate	  on,	  
suggesting	  that	  goals	  could	  be	  primed	  when	  they	  were	  not	  immediately	  relevant	  to	  the	  task	  context.	  To	  
test	  the	  importance	  of	  task	  context	  for	  priming	  the	  stop	  goal,	  we	  compared	  priming	  from	  ‘STOP’	  in	  
conditions	  in	  which	  the	  stop	  goal	  was	  and	  was	  not	  relevant	  to	  the	  task	  context.	  	  If	  the	  stop	  goal	  can	  be	  
primed	  only	  when	  it	  is	  relevant	  to	  the	  task	  context,	  then	  we	  should	  observe	  goal	  priming	  only	  in	  
conditions	  in	  which	  subjects	  were	  instructed	  to	  stop	  occasionally	  (making	  the	  stop	  goal	  relevant	  to	  the	  
task	  context).	  	  If	  the	  stop	  goal	  can	  be	  primed	  when	  it	  is	  not	  relevant	  to	  the	  task	  context,	  then	  we	  should	  
observe	  goal	  priming	  in	  conditions	  in	  which	  subjects	  were	  instructed	  to	  go	  on	  all	  trials	  (making	  the	  stop	  
goal	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  task	  context).	  	  
There	  were	  three	  conditions:	  a	  stop-­‐signal	  condition,	  a	  go-­‐only	  condition,	  and	  a	  go/no-­‐go	  
condition.	  The	  stop-­‐signal	  condition	  was	  similar	  to	  Experiment	  1,	  in	  which	  the	  stop	  goal	  was	  relevant	  to	  
the	  task	  context.	  In	  the	  go-­‐only	  condition,	  no	  stop	  signals	  were	  presented	  so	  the	  stop	  goal	  was	  not	  
relevant	  to	  the	  task	  context.	  If	  goal	  priming	  occurs	  only	  when	  the	  goal	  is	  relevant	  to	  the	  task	  context,	  
then	  the	  ‘STOP’	  prime	  should	  impair	  go	  performance	  in	  the	  stop	  condition	  but	  not	  in	  the	  go-­‐only	  
condition.	  However,	  go	  RTs	  are	  generally	  faster	  in	  go-­‐only	  tasks	  than	  in	  stop-­‐signal	  tasks	  (Verbruggen,	  &	  
Logan,	  in	  press),	  so	  goal	  priming	  may	  fail	  because	  there	  is	  not	  enough	  time	  for	  it	  to	  affect	  go	  
performance	  (Logan,	  1980).	  Therefore,	  we	  included	  a	  go/no-­‐go	  condition,	  in	  which	  subjects	  were	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instructed	  to	  respond	  when	  a	  go	  stimulus	  (e.g.,	  a	  square)	  was	  presented	  and	  not	  to	  respond	  when	  a	  no-­‐
go	  stimulus	  (e.g.,	  a	  circle)	  was	  presented.	  	  Many	  researchers	  assume	  that	  no-­‐go	  stimuli	  require	  response	  
inhibition,	  although	  inhibition	  demands	  may	  be	  lower	  than	  in	  the	  stop-­‐signal	  paradigm	  (Rubia	  et	  al.,	  
2001;	  Verbruggen	  &	  Logan,	  2008a).	  	  Go	  RT	  is	  typically	  faster	  in	  go/no-­‐go	  conditions	  than	  in	  go-­‐only	  
conditions	  (Donders,	  1868/1969),	  so	  if	  goal	  priming	  depends	  on	  response	  speed,	  then	  we	  should	  see	  no	  
goal	  priming	  in	  the	  go/no-­‐go	  condition	  and	  the	  go-­‐only	  condition	  because	  there	  is	  not	  enough	  time	  for	  
goals	  to	  influence	  go	  processing.	  	  However,	  if	  goal	  priming	  depends	  on	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  stop	  goal	  to	  
the	  task	  context,	  then	  we	  should	  see	  goal	  priming	  in	  the	  go/no-­‐go	  condition	  but	  not	  in	  the	  go-­‐only	  
condition.	  
Method	  	  
Sixty	  students	  from	  Vanderbilt	  University	  participated	  for	  course	  credit.	  Twenty	  subjects	  were	  assigned	  
to	  each	  condition.	  Apparatus,	  stimuli	  and	  procedure	  were	  similar	  to	  Experiment	  1,	  except	  for	  the	  
following.	  In	  the	  go-­‐only	  condition,	  100%	  of	  the	  trials	  were	  go	  trials.	  In	  the	  go/no-­‐go	  condition,	  50%	  of	  
the	  trials	  were	  go	  trials,	  on	  which	  subjects	  had	  to	  press	  the	  space	  bar;	  50%	  were	  no-­‐go	  trials,	  on	  which	  
they	  had	  to	  withhold	  the	  response.	  For	  half	  of	  the	  subjects,	  a	  square	  was	  the	  go	  stimulus	  and	  a	  circle	  
was	  the	  no-­‐go	  stimulus.	  For	  the	  other	  half	  of	  the	  subjects,	  this	  mapping	  was	  reversed.	  No	  auditory	  stop	  
signals	  were	  presented	  in	  the	  go-­‐only	  and	  go/no-­‐go	  conditions.	  
	   For	  each	  condition,	  ‘GO’	  was	  presented	  on	  half	  of	  the	  trials;	  ‘STOP’	  was	  presented	  on	  the	  other	  
half	  of	  the	  trials.	  Each	  condition	  started	  with	  a	  practice	  block	  of	  32	  trials,	  followed	  by	  10	  experimental	  
blocks	  of	  64	  trials.	  	  
Results	  and	  Discussion	  
Means	  appear	  in	  Tables	  1	  and	  2,	  and	  were	  analyzed	  by	  means	  of	  3	  (condition:	  stop,	  go-­‐only,	  no-­‐go)	  x	  2	  
(prime:	  GO	  or	  STOP)	  mixed	  ANOVA.	  We	  used	  the	  same	  exclusion	  criteria	  as	  for	  Experiment	  1.	  We	  found	  
that	  RTs	  were	  longer	  for	  ‘STOP’	  than	  for	  ‘GO’	  in	  the	  stop-­‐signal	  condition	  and	  the	  go/no-­‐go	  condition	  but	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not	  in	  the	  go-­‐only	  condition	  (Tables	  1	  and	  3).	  This	  conclusion	  was	  supported	  by	  a	  significant	  interaction	  
between	  condition	  and	  prime,	  and	  suggests	  that	  priming	  is	  contextually	  dependent.	  Based	  on	  the	  
findings	  of	  Experiment	  1,	  we	  argue	  that	  the	  RT	  difference	  between	  ‘STOP’	  and	  ‘GO’	  reflects	  a	  priming	  
cost	  due	  to	  priming	  the	  stop	  goal;	  Experiment	  2	  demonstrates	  that	  this	  priming	  only	  occurred	  when	  the	  
stop	  goal	  is	  relevant	  to	  the	  task	  context.	  The	  interaction	  between	  priming	  and	  context	  also	  
demonstrates	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  primes	  was	  important,	  and	  that	  the	  observed	  priming	  effects	  
were	  not	  simply	  due	  to	  perceptual	  factors,	  which	  were	  constant	  across	  the	  three	  conditions.	  	  
	   There	  were	  overall	  RT	  differences	  between	  conditions:	  Go	  RT	  was	  longer	  in	  the	  stop-­‐signal	  
condition	  than	  in	  the	  go-­‐only	  condition,	  and	  was	  longer	  in	  the	  go-­‐only	  condition	  than	  in	  the	  go/no-­‐go	  
condition	  (Tables	  1	  and	  3).	  The	  overall	  differences	  dissociate	  processing	  speed	  from	  goal	  priming:	  
priming	  was	  observed	  when	  performance	  was	  slowest	  (stop-­‐signal)	  and	  fastest	  (go/no-­‐go)	  but	  not	  when	  
performance	  was	  intermediate	  (go-­‐only).	  	  The	  dissociation	  between	  processing	  speed	  and	  goal	  priming	  
was	  further	  supported	  by	  an	  analysis	  of	  RT	  distributions	  (see	  Figure	  3).	  For	  every	  condition	  and	  prime,	  
we	  calculated	  4	  sample	  quantiles	  (Ratcliff,	  1979)	  and	  reanalyzed	  RTs	  by	  means	  of	  a	  mixed	  ANOVA	  with	  
prime,	  condition	  and	  quantile	  as	  factors.	  We	  replicated	  the	  findings	  reported	  in	  Table	  3.	  Importantly,	  the	  
priming	  effect	  and	  the	  interaction	  between	  priming	  and	  condition	  were	  not	  influenced	  by	  quantile;	  both	  
Fs	  <	  1.	  This	  supports	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  priming	  effect	  did	  not	  depend	  on	  response	  speed.	  	  	  
	   In	  the	  stop-­‐signal	  condition,	  SSRT	  was	  similar	  for	  GO-­‐	  and	  STOP-­‐prime	  trials,	  F	  <	  1.	  In	  the	  go/no-­‐
go	  condition,	  the	  probability	  of	  responding	  on	  no-­‐go	  trials	  was	  comparable	  for	  GO-­‐	  and	  STOP-­‐prime	  
trials,	  F(1,19)	  =	  2.6,	  	  p	  >	  .12.	  These	  findings	  suggest	  that	  stop	  performance	  was	  not	  influenced	  by	  the	  
primes.	  	  
Experiment	  3	  
In	  Experiments	  1	  and	  2,	  we	  found	  that	  going	  was	  influenced	  by	  the	  primes	  but	  stopping	  was	  not.	  In	  
Experiments	  1	  and	  2,	  the	  prime	  and	  the	  go	  stimulus	  were	  integrated	  (i.e.,	  they	  appeared	  in	  the	  same	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modality	  at	  the	  same	  location),	  but	  the	  primes	  and	  the	  stop	  signals	  were	  not	  (i.e.,	  they	  appeared	  in	  
different	  modalities)2.	  Several	  studies	  demonstrated	  that	  non-­‐integrated	  primes	  produce	  less	  
interference	  than	  integrated	  primes	  (for	  a	  review,	  see	  Macleod,	  1991).	  Therefore,	  in	  Experiment	  3,	  we	  
presented	  the	  stimuli	  ‘GO,‘	  	  ‘###’,	  or	  ‘STOP’	  as	  stop	  signals	  in	  a	  stop-­‐signal	  task	  (see	  Figure	  2)	  to	  increase	  
the	  likelihood	  that	  goal	  priming	  would	  influence	  the	  stop	  process.	  Subjects	  were	  told	  to	  inhibit	  the	  go	  
response	  whenever	  any	  of	  these	  stimuli	  appeared.	  If	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  stop	  signals	  activates	  task	  goals,	  
then	  SSRT	  should	  be	  longer	  for	  ‘GO’	  than	  for	  ‘###’	  and	  ‘STOP’.	  If	  stop	  performance	  is	  somehow	  
impervious	  to	  priming,	  then	  SSRT	  should	  be	  similar	  for	  ‘GO’,	  ‘###’	  and	  ‘STOP’.	  As	  in	  previous	  
experiments,	  subjects	  discriminated	  shapes	  in	  the	  go	  task.	  	  	  
	   The	  stop	  signals	  in	  Experiment	  3	  varied	  in	  size	  as	  well	  as	  identity.	  Perceptual	  factors	  can	  
influence	  SSRT	  (Cavina-­‐Pratesi,	  Bricolo,	  Prior,	  &	  Marzi,	  2001;	  Morein-­‐Zamir	  &	  Kingstone,	  2006),	  so	  SSRT	  
may	  be	  longer	  for	  shorter	  stop	  signals	  (GO)	  than	  for	  longer	  stop	  signals	  (###	  or	  STOP).	  To	  examine	  the	  
effects	  of	  stop-­‐signal	  length	  (i.e,	  the	  number	  of	  characters),	  we	  included	  a	  simple	  detection	  block	  at	  the	  
end	  of	  the	  experiment.	  On	  every	  trial,	  ‘GO’,	  ‘###’,	  or	  ‘STOP’	  was	  presented	  and	  subjects	  were	  instructed	  
to	  respond	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible	  to	  these	  stimuli	  by	  pressing	  the	  space	  bar.	  If	  ‘GO’	  is	  detected	  more	  
slowly	  than‘###’	  or	  ‘STOP’,	  then	  SSRTs	  should	  be	  interpreted	  with	  caution.	  
Method	  	  
Twenty	  students	  from	  Vanderbilt	  University	  participated	  for	  monetary	  compensation.	  None	  of	  them	  
participated	  in	  Experiments	  1-­‐2.	  Apparatus,	  stimuli	  and	  procedure	  were	  similar	  to	  Experiment	  1,	  except	  
for	  the	  following.	  On	  go	  trials,	  a	  non-­‐filled	  shape	  was	  presented	  (Figure	  2).	  On	  25%	  of	  the	  trials,	  a	  stop	  
signal	  appeared	  in	  the	  shape.	  We	  used	  three	  stop	  signals	  (GO,	  ###	  and	  STOP),	  which	  occurred	  with	  equal	  
probability.	  The	  shapes	  and	  the	  stop	  signals	  appeared	  in	  white	  on	  a	  black	  background.	  	  The	  experiment	  
started	  with	  one	  practice	  block	  of	  64	  trials,	  followed	  by	  12	  experimental	  blocks	  of	  72	  trials.	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   At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment,	  subjects	  performed	  a	  block	  of	  120	  detection	  trials.	  The	  stimuli	  
were	  ‘GO’,	  ‘###’	  and	  ‘STOP’.	  The	  stimuli	  occurred	  with	  equal	  probability	  and	  remained	  on	  the	  screen	  for	  
1,000	  ms,	  regardless	  of	  RT.	  Subjects	  were	  instructed	  to	  press	  the	  space	  bar	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible	  when	  
they	  detected	  the	  stimulus.	  ITI	  was	  drawn	  from	  an	  exponential	  distribution	  (mean	  =	  1,000	  ms;	  minimum	  
=	  100	  ms,	  maximum	  =	  3,000	  ms),	  and	  varied	  randomly	  between	  trials.	  	  
	  
	  
Results	  and	  Discussion	  
Mean	  go	  RT	  was	  441	  ms;	  mean	  percentage	  of	  correct	  go	  responses	  was	  98.5%.	  	  Means	  of	  stop	  
performance	  appear	  in	  Table	  2.	  SSRT	  was	  analyzed	  by	  means	  of	  a	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVA	  with	  stop	  
signal	  (GO,	  ###,	  STOP)	  as	  a	  within-­‐subjects	  factor	  (Table	  3).	  SSRT	  was	  longer	  for	  ‘GO’	  than	  for	  “###’,	  
suggesting	  that	  stop	  performance	  was	  impaired	  when	  the	  stop	  signal	  was	  associated	  with	  the	  
incongruent	  go	  goal.	  There	  was	  no	  difference	  between	  ‘###’	  and	  ‘STOP’,	  suggesting	  that	  priming	  
produced	  a	  cost	  but	  no	  benefit.	  In	  the	  detection	  condition,	  we	  found	  that	  detection	  RT	  was	  similar	  for	  all	  
stimuli	  (GO	  =	  299	  ms,	  ###	  =	  302	  ms,	  STOP	  =	  303	  ms;	  F	  <	  1),	  which	  suggests	  that	  the	  observed	  SSRT	  
differences	  were	  not	  due	  to	  differences	  in	  the	  length	  of	  the	  stop	  signal.	  This	  conclusion	  is	  further	  
supported	  by	  the	  data	  of	  a	  pilot	  experiment,	  in	  which	  we	  presented	  ‘##’	  (12	  x	  7	  mm)	  and	  ‘####’	  (24	  x	  7	  
mm)	  as	  stop	  signals	  (number	  of	  signal	  trials	  per	  stop	  signal	  =	  48;	  number	  of	  subjects	  =	  20).	  We	  found	  
that	  SSRT	  was	  similar	  for	  the	  two	  stop	  signals	  (##	  =	  231	  ms;	  ####	  =	  228	  ms),	  F	  <	  1.	  This	  suggests	  that	  
relatively	  small	  differences	  in	  stop-­‐signal	  length	  do	  not	  influence	  stop	  performance	  much.	  
General	  Discussion	  
Response	  inhibition	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  key	  component	  of	  cognitive	  control.	  In	  the	  present	  study,	  we	  
asked	  whether	  response	  inhibition	  can	  be	  primed	  automatically	  by	  irrelevant	  information	  in	  the	  
environment.	  Consistent	  with	  the	  automatic	  control	  hypothesis,	  we	  found	  that	  the	  go	  and	  stop	  goals	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were	  activated	  automatically	  by	  primes.	  However,	  the	  effects	  were	  numerically	  small,	  and	  the	  
differences	  could	  be	  due	  to	  a	  small	  number	  of	  subjects	  with	  large	  priming	  effects.	  To	  test	  this	  idea,	  we	  
plotted	  the	  difference	  between	  ‘STOP’	  and	  ‘GO’	  for	  the	  stop-­‐signal	  conditions	  of	  Experiments	  1-­‐3.	  As	  can	  
be	  seen	  in	  Figure	  4,	  the	  priming	  effects	  were	  highly	  consistent	  across	  subjects.	  Thus,	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  
present	  study	  clearly	  support	  the	  idea	  that	  cognitive	  control	  can	  be	  triggered	  in	  a	  stimulus-­‐driven	  
(unintentional)	  fashion	  as	  well	  as	  in	  a	  top-­‐down	  (intentional)	  fashion.	  	  	  
	   	  Task	  goals	  were	  primed	  by	  task-­‐irrelevant	  information,	  but	  performance	  depended	  mainly	  on	  
intentionally	  activated	  goals.	  On	  STOP-­‐prime	  trials	  in	  Experiments	  1-­‐2,	  go	  RT	  was	  prolonged	  but	  subjects	  
executed	  the	  go	  response	  on	  virtually	  all	  go	  trials	  (Table	  1);	  similarly,	  on	  GO-­‐prime	  trials	  in	  Experiment	  3,	  
SSRT	  was	  prolonged	  but	  the	  tracking	  procedure	  worked	  well	  and	  subjects	  stopped	  on	  approximately	  half	  
of	  the	  stop-­‐signal	  trials	  (Table	  2).	  	  Thus,	  the	  automatically	  activated	  goals	  interfered	  with	  performance,	  
but	  the	  intentionally	  activated	  goals	  determined	  whether	  subjects	  actually	  responded	  or	  stopped.	  More	  
generally,	  these	  results	  suggest	  that	  response	  inhibition	  can	  rely	  on	  automatically	  activated	  task	  goals,	  
but	  only	  in	  combination	  with	  intentionally	  activated	  goals.	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  results	  from	  other	  
studies	  of	  automaticity,	  which	  show	  that	  automatically-­‐activated	  responses	  influence	  performance,	  
even	  though	  subjects	  almost	  always	  execute	  the	  intentionally	  activated	  response	  (	  Logan,	  1980;	  Tzelgov,	  
Henik,	  &	  Leiser,	  1990).	  	  	  
	   The	  results	  of	  Experiment	  2	  suggest	  that	  goal	  priming	  depended	  on	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  task	  
goal	  to	  the	  task	  context:	  We	  found	  that	  the	  stop	  goal	  was	  primed	  when	  it	  was	  relevant	  to	  the	  task	  
context	  (i.e,	  in	  the	  stop-­‐signal	  and	  go/no-­‐go	  conditions),	  but	  not	  when	  it	  was	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  task	  
context	  (i.e,	  in	  the	  choice	  condition).	  This	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  finding	  that	  automatic	  goal	  priming	  
does	  not	  require	  an	  intentionally	  activated	  goal	  to	  operate	  on	  (e.g.,	  Bargh	  et	  al.	  ,	  2001),	  but	  is	  consistent	  
with	  the	  finding	  that	  responses	  are	  primed	  automatically	  only	  by	  features	  that	  are	  important	  to	  the	  task	  
context	  	  (Hommel,	  1996;	  Logan	  &	  Etherton,	  1994;	  but	  see	  Rubin	  &	  Koch,	  2006).	  Baseline	  activation	  of	  
12 
 
context-­‐relevant	  goals	  may	  be	  higher	  than	  baseline	  activation	  of	  context-­‐irrelevant	  goals.	  Consequently,	  
the	  priming	  effects	  will	  be	  stronger	  when	  the	  goal	  is	  relevant	  to	  the	  task	  context	  than	  when	  it	  is	  
irrelevant.	  An	  alternative	  idea	  is	  that	  subjects	  need	  to	  find	  a	  balance	  between	  goal	  shielding	  and	  
flexibility	  when	  several	  task	  goals	  are	  relevant:	  goals	  must	  be	  shielded	  from	  irrelevant	  information,	  but	  
irrelevant	  information	  must	  be	  processed	  to	  some	  degree	  to	  respond	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  environment	  
(Goschke	  &	  Dreisbach,	  2008).	  Thus,	  subjects	  may	  be	  more	  vulnerable	  to	  information	  in	  the	  environment	  
in	  situations	  in	  which	  flexible	  behavior	  is	  required	  (like	  the	  stop-­‐signal	  condition),	  leading	  to	  larger	  
priming	  effects.	  In	  sum,	  our	  finding	  of	  goal	  priming	  in	  response	  inhibition	  paradigms	  is	  consistent	  with	  
previous	  findings	  (e.g.,	  Aarts	  et	  al.,	  2004;	  Bargh	  et	  al.,	  2001;	  Shah,	  2003),	  although	  priming	  of	  the	  stop	  
goal	  may	  depend	  more	  strongly	  on	  task	  context	  (cf.	  Bargh	  et	  al,	  2001).	  Future	  research	  is	  needed	  to	  
clarify	  further	  when	  goal	  priming	  needs	  an	  intentionally	  activated	  goal	  to	  act	  on.	  
	   Recent	  work	  suggests	  that	  goals	  can	  be	  activated	  automatically	  via	  the	  retrieval	  of	  learned	  
stimulus-­‐task	  associations	  in	  response-­‐inhibition	  paradigms	  (Verbruggen	  &	  Logan,	  2008a;	  Verbruggen	  &	  
Logan,	  2008b)	  and	  task-­‐switching	  paradigms	  (Koch	  &	  Allport,	  2006;	  Waszak	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  Similar	  priming	  
effects	  have	  been	  observed	  when	  goal-­‐relevant	  stimuli	  are	  presented	  subliminally,	  suggesting	  that	  goals	  
can	  be	  activated	  unconsciously	  in	  the	  stop-­‐signal	  paradigm	  (Van	  Gaal,	  Ridderinkhof,	  van	  den	  
Wildenberg,	  &	  Lamme,	  in	  press)	  and	  in	  the	  task-­‐switching	  paradigm	  (Mattler,	  2003).	  Consistent	  with	  the	  
findings	  of	  the	  present	  study,	  these	  studies	  found	  that	  priming	  incongruent	  goals	  interfered	  with	  
performance,	  but	  intentionally-­‐activated	  goals	  determined	  which	  response	  was	  executed.	  The	  present	  
results	  add	  to	  these	  findings	  by	  showing	  that	  goals	  can	  be	  activated	  automatically	  by	  pre-­‐existing	  
semantic	  associations	  between	  irrelevant	  information	  in	  the	  task	  environment	  and	  task	  goals.	  	  
	   The	  goal	  priming	  effects	  in	  the	  present	  experiments	  and	  previous	  ones	  can	  be	  explained	  in	  
terms	  of	  a	  stochastic	  accumulator	  model	  in	  which	  evidence	  for	  each	  goal	  accumulates	  until	  it	  reaches	  a	  
threshold	  (Logan,	  1980;	  Ratcliff	  &	  Smith,	  2004;	  see	  also	  Boucher,	  	  Palmeri,	  Logan,	  &	  Schall,	  2007).	  	  The	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higher	  the	  	  accumulation	  rate,	  the	  faster	  the	  threshold	  is	  reached.	  The	  accumulation	  rate	  depends	  
primarily	  on	  the	  match	  between	  task-­‐relevant	  stimuli	  and	  the	  intended	  goals,	  with	  higher	  rates	  for	  
better	  matches.	  	  However,	  accumulation	  rate	  may	  also	  be	  influenced	  by	  the	  match	  between	  irrelevant	  
stimuli	  and	  the	  intended	  goals:	  congruent	  stimuli	  increase	  accumulation	  rate	  (decreasing	  the	  time	  
required	  to	  reach	  threshold),	  whereas	  incongruent	  stimuli	  decrease	  accumulation	  rate	  (increasing	  the	  
time	  required	  to	  reach	  threshold;	  Logan,	  1980).	  Two	  properties	  of	  this	  accumulator	  model	  are	  especially	  
relevant	  to	  the	  present	  experiments.	  	  First,	  the	  effects	  of	  task-­‐relevant	  stimuli	  on	  accumulation	  rate	  are	  
greater	  than	  the	  effects	  of	  task-­‐irrelevant	  stimuli,	  or	  subjects	  would	  always	  make	  errors	  on	  incongruent	  
trials	  (Logan,	  1980).	  	  This	  implies	  that	  intentionally-­‐activated	  goals	  must	  have	  stronger	  effects	  than	  
automatically-­‐activated	  goals,	  as	  we	  suggested	  earlier.	  	  Second,	  the	  costs	  of	  incongruent	  primes	  on	  RT	  
are	  greater	  than	  the	  benefits	  from	  congruent	  primes	  even	  if	  the	  effects	  on	  accumulation	  rate	  are	  the	  
same.	  This	  is	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  5	  which	  plots	  accumulation	  rates	  for	  congruent,	  neutral,	  and	  
incongruent	  prime	  trials.	  	  We	  assume	  that	  congruent	  and	  incongruent	  primes	  change	  accumulation	  rate	  
by	  the	  same	  amount	  but	  in	  different	  directions	  (congruent	  primes	  add	  X	  units;	  incongruent	  primes	  
subtract	  X	  units).	  	  Thus,	  the	  angle	  between	  congruent	  and	  neutral	  is	  the	  same	  as	  the	  angle	  between	  
neutral	  and	  incongruent.	  Nevertheless,	  when	  these	  accumulation	  rates	  project	  onto	  the	  threshold,	  the	  
difference	  between	  congruent	  and	  neutral	  is	  much	  smaller	  than	  the	  difference	  between	  incongruent	  
and	  neutral	  (Figure	  5).	  	  If	  the	  change	  in	  accumulation	  rate	  is	  small,	  as	  it	  must	  have	  been	  in	  our	  
experiments,	  we	  would	  observe	  no	  goal-­‐priming	  benefits	  but	  significant	  goal-­‐priming	  costs.	  	   	  
	   To	  conclude,	  previous	  studies	  showed	  that	  goal-­‐directed	  actions	  can	  be	  started	  and	  guided	  to	  
completion	  automatically	  by	  information	  in	  the	  task	  environment.	  The	  present	  study	  showed	  that	  
inhibiting	  an	  ongoing	  action	  can	  also	  be	  guided	  automatically	  by	  irrelevant	  information	  in	  the	  task	  
environment.	  We	  argue	  that	  executive	  control	  processes	  such	  as	  response	  inhibition	  can	  be	  triggered	  
both	  in	  a	  top-­‐down	  and	  a	  bottom-­‐up	  fashion	  (also	  see	  Hassin,	  Aarts,	  Eitam,	  Custers,	  &	  Kleiman,	  2009).	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Stimulus-­‐driven,	  bottom-­‐up	  control	  reduces	  the	  need	  for	  voluntary,	  top-­‐down	  decisions.	  Consequently,	  
automaticity	  and	  cognitive	  control	  should	  not	  be	  regarded	  as	  opposites,	  as	  they	  may	  go	  hand	  in	  hand	  in	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Footnote	  1	  (p.	  5)	  
In	  additional	  analyses,	  we	  also	  excluded	  outlying	  RTs	  that	  were	  longer	  than	  mean	  +	  2.5	  standard	  
deviations	  for	  each	  trial	  type;	  similar	  results	  were	  found.	  In	  the	  analysis	  reported	  in	  the	  text,	  we	  did	  not	  
exclude	  outlying	  RTs.	  	  
	  
Footnote	  2	  (p.	  8)	  
In	  the	  go/no-­‐go	  condition,	  the	  prime	  and	  no-­‐go	  stimulus	  were	  integrated.	  However,	  we	  may	  not	  have	  
seen	  a	  priming	  effect	  on	  stopping	  because	  probability	  of	  responding	  on	  a	  no-­‐go	  trial	  was	  generally	  very	  





Table	  1:	  Means	  for	  go	  RT,	  percentage	  of	  go	  errors	  (i.e.,	  erroneous	  choice	  response)	  and	  percentage	  of	  
missed	  go	  responses	  for	  Experiment	  1	  and	  the	  three	  conditions	  (stop-­‐signal,	  go-­‐only,	  go/no-­‐go)	  in	  
Experiment	  2,	  as	  a	  function	  of	  the	  prime	  (GO,	  STOP	  or	  ###).	  
	  
	   Experiment	  1	   Experiment	  2	  
	   stop-­‐signal	  	   go-­‐only	  	   no-­‐go	  	  
	   GO	   ###	   STOP	   GO	   STOP	   GO	   STOP	   GO	   STOP	  
go	  RT	   439	   440	   445	   477	   487	   404	   405	   344	   348	  
go	  error	   3.2	   3	   3.3	   2.2	   2.5	   2.3	   2.4	   -­‐	   -­‐	  



















Table	  2:	  Means	  for	  the	  stop	  data	  as	  a	  function	  of	  the	  prime	  (Experiments	  1-­‐2)	  or	  stop	  signal	  (Experiment	  
3)	  






	   GO	   ###	   STOP	   GO	   STOP	   GO	   STOP	   GO	   ###	   STOP	  
p(r|s)	   .51	   .51	   .51	   .51	   .50	   .007	   .013	   .50	   .50	   .50	  
SSD	   191	   192	   206	   255	   263	   -­‐	   -­‐	   212	   224	   225	  
SSRT	   255	   246	   255	   233	   233	   -­‐	   -­‐	   232	   219	   219	  
SR-­‐RT	   402	   396	   400	   428	   440	   -­‐	   -­‐	   399	   398	   401	  
	  
Note:	  p(r|s)	  =	  the	  probability	  of	  responding	  on	  a	  signal	  trial	  or	  no-­‐go	  trial;	  SR-­‐RT	  =	  signal-­‐respond	  
reaction	  time.	  For	  signal-­‐respond	  RT,	  we	  included	  only	  signal-­‐respond	  trials	  that	  followed	  a	  correct	  no-­‐
signal	  trial	  and	  on	  which	  the	  executed	  response	  corresponded	  to	  the	  response	  expected	  on	  no-­‐signal	  
trials	  (i.e.,	  ‘Z’	  for	  square	  and	  ‘/’	  for	  circle).	  For	  signal-­‐respond	  RT,	  none	  of	  the	  differences	  was	  significant	  







Table	  3:	  Overview	  analyses	  for	  Experiments	  1-­‐3	  	  
	  
	  
	   df	   F	   MSE	   partial	  η2	  
	   Experiment	  1:	  Global	  analysis	  go	  RT	  
Prime	   2,	  38	   4.2*	   61	   0.18	  
	   Experiment	  1:	  Planned	  comparisons	  go	  RT	  (prime	  word)	  
GO	  vs.	  ###	   1,	  38	   0.6	   61	   0.01	  
###	  vs.	  STOP	   1,	  38	   4.1*	   61	   0.10	  
	   Experiment	  2:	  Global	  analysis	  go	  RT	  
Prime	   1,	  57	   19.6***	   39	   0.26	  
Condition	   2,	  57	   20.5***	   9,050	   0.42	  
Prime	  x	  condition	   2,	  57	   5.6**	   39	   0.16	  
	   Experiment	  2:	  Planned	  comparisons	  go	  RT	  (prime	  word)	  
Stop-­‐signal	  condition	   1,	  57	   26.5***	   39	   0.32	  
Go-­‐only	  condition	   1,	  57	   0.3	   39	   0.00	  
Go/no-­‐go	  condition	   1,	  57	   3.9†	   39	   0.06	  
	   Experiment	  2:	  Planned	  comparisons	  go	  RT	  (condition)	  
Stop-­‐signal	  vs.	  go-­‐only	   1,	  57	   13.2**	   9,050	   0.19	  
Go-­‐only	  vs.	  go/no-­‐go	   1,	  57	   7.5**	   9,050	   .12	  
	   Experiment	  3:	  Global	  analysis	  SSRT	  
Stop	  signal	   2,38	   15.0**	   73	   .44	  
	   Experiment	  3:	  Planned	  comparisons	  SSRT	  (stop	  signal)	  
GO	  vs.	  ###	   1,38	   20.6**	   73	   .35	  
###	  vs.	  STOP	   1,38	   0.1	   73	   .00	  
	  
***p	  <	  .001,	  **p	  <	  .01,	  *p	  <	  .05,	  †p	  =	  .05	  







Figure	  1:	  Depiction	  of	  a	  trial	  course	  and	  the	  trial	  types	  in	  Experiment	  1.	  All	  trials	  started	  with	  the	  
presentation	  of	  a	  fixation	  cross,	  which	  was	  replaced	  by	  the	  stimulus	  after	  500	  ms.	  The	  stimulus	  
remained	  on	  the	  screen	  for	  1,500	  ms,	  regardless	  of	  RT.	  The	  intertrial	  interval	  was	  1,000	  ms.	  On	  stop-­‐
signal	  trials,	  an	  auditory	  stop	  signal	  was	  presented	  for	  75	  ms	  after	  a	  variable	  delay	  (SSD).	  
	  
Figure	  2:	  Depiction	  of	  of	  a	  trial	  course	  and	  the	  trial	  types	  in	  Experiment	  3.	  All	  trials	  started	  with	  the	  
presentation	  of	  a	  fixation	  cross,	  which	  was	  replaced	  by	  the	  stimulus	  after	  500	  ms.	  The	  stimulus	  
remained	  on	  the	  screen	  for	  1,500	  ms,	  regardless	  of	  RT.	  The	  intertrial	  interval	  was	  1,000	  ms.	  On	  stop-­‐
signal	  trials,	  a	  visual	  stop	  signal	  was	  presented	  after	  a	  variable	  delay	  (SSD).	  
	  
Figure	  3:	  reaction	  times	  for	  the	  4	  sample	  quantiles	  as	  a	  function	  condition	  and	  prime	  
	  
Figure	  4:	  The	  numerical	  difference	  between	  incongruent	  and	  congruent	  primes	  for	  the	  stop-­‐signal	  
conditions	  of	  Experiments	  1-­‐3.	  For	  each	  experiment,	  the	  difference	  scores	  are	  ordered	  (smallest	  effect	  
sizes	  on	  the	  left,	  largest	  effect	  sizes	  in	  the	  right).	  	  
 
Figure	  5:	  Depiction	  of	  the	  stochastic	  accumulator	  account	  of	  goal	  priming.	  	  Activation	  begins	  when	  a	  
stimulus	  is	  presented	  and	  accumulates	  toward	  a	  threshold	  at	  a	  constant	  rate.	  	  A	  goal	  is	  selected	  when	  
activation	  reaches	  the	  threshold.	  	  Finishing-­‐time	  distributions	  are	  plotted	  as	  the	  points	  at	  which	  
activation	  reaches	  the	  threshold	  for	  each	  prime	  type.	  	  The	  sloping	  lines	  represent	  the	  mean	  
accumulation	  of	  activation	  for	  congruent,	  neutral,	  and	  incongruent	  prime	  trials.	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